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RESPONSE TO RODES AND SHAFFER'S "A
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY FOR ROMAN
CATHOLIC LAW SCHOOLS"
Richard B. Saphire*
In a sense, it might seem odd for a non-Catholic and a non-Christian to be asked to comment on a paper entitled "A Christian Theology
for Roman Catholic Law Schools." In another sense, however, it seems
to me perfectly natural. For the last dozen or so years, I have been a
member of the Law Faculty at the University of Dayton. From my
vantage point, I have had the opportunity to participate in the culture
of a Roman Catholic University which has seen itself as deeply embedded within, and a steward of, its theological and philosophical traditions. During that time, I have also had the chance to observe, and the
opportunity and challenge of helping to educate, a student body which
I believe has been largely Catholic. This experience has qualified me as
an informed observer of the ways in which the University's religious
commitments relate to its educational mission and aspirations.
There is much that is provocative and illuminating in the ShafferRodes analysis. So much so that, in the present context, I can only
touch on some of its central themes.
One of the paper's central propositions is that "the Church is present in the law school, and the law school is present in the Church. It
is present as the Church." In what way is the Church present in the
law school? One way in which the statement appears not to be true is
in its most literal sense. Our law school-and I suspect most Catholic
law schools-is not, or has seemed to me as not, directly involved in an
effort to teach a set of values which can be understood as Catholic, or
at least uniquely Catholic. (Indeed, the paper acknowledges that the
theological discussions that should be carried on in a Catholic law
school "cannot be carried on well without the participation of Jews and
non-Catholic Christians."') This is not to say that we do not, or should
not, expose our students to Catholic or Christian theological principles
as they relate to law and legal institutions. In our catalogue of courses,
we have several courses which might explicitly lend themselves to such
* Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. This essay is a somewhat revised
version of a response to the principal paper, delivered by Professors Thomas L. Shaffer and Robert
E. Rodes, Jr., of the Notre Dame School of Law, presented at the Vincent R. Vasey Symposium,
held at the University of Dayton School of Law on January 25, 1989.
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a discussion-such as Judeo-Christian Ethics and the Law, Religion
and the Law, and Comparative Law. And our Jurisprudence course
would no doubt also make such discussions relevant-at least I suspect
this was so when Vince Vasey taught the course. But we do not as a
law school make an effort, whether in specific courses or throughout
our curriculum, to inculcate our students with Christian theological
principles, as such, or to teach such principles as truth. And in my
judgment, it is proper that we do not.
If we do not teach Catholic/Christian principles in this way, in
what other way is the "Church present in the law school"? Perhaps it
could be argued that the Church is present in the law
school-inevitably and unmistakably present-because our students are
so predominantly Catholic. In such a context, it might be expected that
our students would bring to their study of the law a vision of the world
or of our society which is, in some way, uniquely Catholic/Christian.
That is, perhaps it is the case that our students bring to their legal
studies a distinctly Catholic perspective-that they analyze and evaluate the law through a set of theological premises generally or uniquely
associated with the teachings of the Church. But my experience, and
my intuition, suggests that this is also not the case. Aside from their
consideration of discrete issues such as the question of whether there
should be a constitutional right of privacy broad enough to encompass
the abortion decision, students seldom evoke self-consciously a Catholic/Christian theology in class discussions or research papers. Indeed, I
suspect that the tone and nature of class (as well as extra-class) discussions in most of our courses is not much different than one would find
in a state law school or a non-church related private law school.
A third possible way in which the Church might be viewed as present in the law school is suggested by the interesting and informative
observation by Professors Shaffer and Rodes that a Catholic law school
has been in the past, and continues to be, an institution used by
Catholics to gain entre to certain circles of status and wealth in our
society that were once closed to them. By doing so, perhaps the law
school might be viewed as a means through which Catholic youth can
not only seek upward social and economic mobility, but through which
they can more effectively bring their "Catholic vision" of the world to
bear in the formation of public policies and institutions. I doubt, however, that Catholic law schools today provide a unique instrument for
the achievement of economic status to Catholic students, and I doubt
that those who run Catholic universities would see this as an especially
important aspect of a religious mission. And, in any event, I doubt that
most of our students come to our law school so that they can more
effectively spread the Church's teachings. Instead, as is the case gener-
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ally, most of our students come to law school for the same reasons all
law students do-because they see a law degree as a vehicle for personal, material advancement and/or (hopefully) because they believe
that the study and practice of law will be personally and intellectually
rewarding and fulfilling.
What other way, then, is there in which a Catholic law school is or
can be an embodiment of the Church? In what way is it present as the
Church? Professors Shaffer and Rodes suggest a more salient response
to this question: "We think the political hermeneutics of the gospel, if
present among us and in our scholarship, would give some hint-some
indication-that the Church is present in what we offer through our
students and in print for the edification of the legal profession." 2 They
go on to state, after criticizing-in my judgment, appropriately criticizing-a past effort by some Catholic officials and legal educators to conflate a Catholic legal education with patriotism, that "Our purposes as
the Church in the world depend on a prophetic perspective that the
God-and-Country tradition in American Catholicism left out of
account."'
The notion that the law school is a place where political hermeneutics is taken seriously, a place where students are invited and even
cajoled to assume a critical posture toward secular legal institutions
and policies, is a powerful and compelling one, and one which, I believe, lies at the heart of a Catholic law school's role and mission. On
this conception, legal education is seen as a process which facilitates-and, I fear in too many cases initiates-a life-long conversation
between law students qua citizens and qua lawyers and the broader
culture in which they will live and which they will help to shape.
The conversation I-and I believe Professors Shaffer and
Rodes-have in mind is the kind of conversation which gives meaning
to-which defines-what our law school means in our mission statement when we speak of our special commitment to training graduates
who not only "will become highly qualified and competent practicing
attorneys who will uphold the highest professional standards," but also
graduates "who are sensitive to the impact of Judeo-Christian ethics on
the law." It is a conversation which does not end-indeed which only
begins-once students learn the rules and principles of law which are
the stuff to which their analytical skills will be applied in the professional world. This conversation is one in which students qua lawyers
bring to bear theological and moral principles and values in a self-con-
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scious way to seek a truer understanding of the laws and institutions
which, as members of the bar, they will take an oath to preserve and
defend.
From this perspective, the achievement of such an understanding
is only part of the task. The understanding we seek, or should seek to
foster, is a self-critical one. Professors Shaffer and Rodes argue that we
would further the process by "getting out of our students' way. Letting
the influence of their mothers shine through." 4 By doing this, we give
recognition to "the profound dependence we have had, in Catholic
schools, on the ethnic traditions that send us their children in the hope
5
for a better life."
My conception of the educational process necessary to this critical
process is somewhat different. While I agree that it is essential that we
begin to form law students "by persuading them that their moral impulses are useful things for a lawyer to have,"' we must do far more
than this. For while our students' moral impulses are important starting points for legal analysis, it is our function to help them (1) become
self-consciously critical of those impulses and (2) to move beyond those
impulses in an effort to work out some sort of coherent and comprehensive moral system within which those impulses can be systematically
brought to bear in understanding and evaluating the law.
The Shaffer-Rodes' conception of the mission of a Catholic law
school is one that, in general, I find congenial and compelling. They
argue that a fundamental aspect of a Catholic law school's mission to
be "present in the world" is its duty-our duty, through our teaching
and scholarship-to encourage students and others to "ask the right
questions,"' questions with which they might not prefer to be confronted. These questions demand answers to why, in a world and a nation as wealthy as ours, so many go hungry, homeless and sick; why, in
a nation which professes its commitment to equality, racism and sexism
and homophobia are still so conspicuous; and perhaps why, in a nation
so professedly committed to the value of human life and the inherent
dignity of each person, capital punishment is viewed as so acceptable
and (at least some) abortions are viewed, by many, as morally unproblematic. I share Shaffer and Rodes' sense of outrage at a legal
system which permits so much poverty and racism to exist. I share the
outrage of some that the state, which professes allegiance to human
life, can so casually execute even the most evil and dangerous of its

4. Id. at 14.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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citizens. And I share the view of many that, at the very least, abortion
presents one of the most profound moral dilemmas confronting our society today.
Given these premises, what is the obligation of the Catholic law
school in educating its students? I would like to say that its obligation
is to instill in its students a sense of obligation to engage in what my
religion's tradition refers to as a tikkun olam-a transformation of the
world which will result in the exposure and correction of its many
injustices.
There are, it seems to me, at least two ways in which this can be
done. First, we as teachers can try to persuade our students to see the
injustices we see and to convince them of the need, and their duty, to
correct them. This seems to be part of the Shaffer-Rodes proposal, but
for reasons I cannot pursue here, I am quite skeptical that we can or
should take this approach as teachers, although I think it is imperative
for us to do so as lawyers and scholars. The second approach seems to
me more promising: We can invite (cajole) our students to, in the
words of Shaffer and Rodes, "examine carefully the interests at stake
in any political, economic, or social decision we have to make ...
."
By doing this, we ask our students to engage in the political hermeneutics of which I believe Shaffer and Rodes speak. By imploring them to
see (instead of allowing them to deny) the ways in which "[t]he institutions by which other people are impoverished and degraded are the
very ones we [as lawyers] have devoted ourselves to studying and serving," 9 we can show them that law is not neutral in ways they might
have supposed. By forcing them to see how law embodies and often
masks specific substantive values, we can hope that they will come to
understand, and perhaps even take seriously, the fact that they must be
morally accountable for the work they will do: That, as lawyers, they
will not simply use or serve a legal system-they will create or preserve
it, and that they must bear the responsibility for doing so.
In closing, I offer two final thoughts. First, it is clear to me that
the "theology" for a Catholic law school I have described, and the one
propounded by Professors Shaffer and Rodes, is not uniquely a Catholic or a Christian theology. It is one that is congenial to, and indeed, I
believe required by, the Jewish tradition from which I come. Indeed, it
seems to me odd to call it a "theology" at all. For the role of legal
education implicit in my remarks is, in my view, inherent to the mission
of any law school in the modern context.
Finally, I must end on a pessimistic-or at least a realistic-note.

8. Id. at 17.
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The self-critical stance of which Professors Shaffer and Rodes speak is
one which many students seem to resist. In their struggle to master the
law's principles and rules, students often perceive the kind of conversation implicit in this theological perspective as irrelevant, or at best only
tangential, to the lawyers' mission. Efforts to encourage students to
subject legal rules and institutions to moral and philosophical critique
are often construed as quixotic forays into meaningless theoretical
swamps by law professors too long cloistered in their ivory towers. But
even if this perception is correct, it seems the lasting message of Shaffer and Rodes is not to despair. For it is only by conceptualizing legal
education as they do that we can truly be faithful to the profound obligation that our participation in a Catholic law school challenges us to
accept.
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